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Abstract Specialized mortgage intermediaries in Denmark have for over
200 years provided owners and buyers of real property wide access to credit. The
present paper sets out to explore the safeguards that nurtured development of a
robust, market based financing system and a deep mortgage market. Observations
are made on the nature of collateral performance in respect to property rights,
mortgage law and market development in search of general features of required
institutional arrangements. The robustness of the Danish mortgage finance system is
largely accredited to the securitization model based on the balance principle that
assigns risks and responsibility to market players in a self-disciplinary manner and
protected the mortgage banks against cash flow mismatches even during deep crisis,
as history attests. It is shown how property registers and effective enforcement have
created transparent property rights and practically reduced legal risks of mortgaging
to zero. Standardization and scale of economics supported collateral efficiency, as
measured in terms of simplicity, transparency, rapidity and costs. The Danish
mortgage finance system illustrates the critical role of government in insuring the
quality and enforceability of mortgage collateral, and reducing uncertainty for
market players throughout the entire process. The paper suggests that sound
incentive structures of the securitization model, strong commitment mechanisms
and the market mechanisms constituted a complex formula of safeguards that—
rather than specific capital coverage requirements—created the preconditions
required for a well-functioning mortgage market.
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1 Introduction
The Danish mortgage finance system is characterized by its long development path
that represents a rare case among financial institutions of an over 200 years’ history,
during which it has provided mortgage credit to a wide section of the Danish society
on market conditions (Andersen 2011; Møller and Nielsen 1997). The current
mortgage law traces its roots back to the first mortgage credit act of 1850, probably
the oldest in the world. Early mortgage markets were developed through mortgage
credit associations on the basis of property rights secured through a century old legal
tradition of public announcements and land book records, now transformed into a
fully digital legal property registry.
In the following collateral safeguards are analyzed in view of both stable and
dynamic features in search of the roots of collateral performance. The composite
nature of collateral security is mapped out, and it is discussed how a low risk
environment was built. A mortgage deed is a money-creating debt contract secured
by a registered interest in the concerned property, but security of collateral is not a
narrow legal issue, as elaborated below.
The robustness of the Danish mortgage finance system is largely accredited to the
securitization model based on the balance principle, a principle that continues to be
vital to the system. Through the balance principle a number of risks are eliminated,
in combination with strong property rights. The qualities of the securitization model
are highlighted in a number of comparative studies (Wyman 2003; Suarez and
Vassallo 2004; Nadler 2005). A study by the International Monetary Fund stated
that the Danish mortgage system is widely recognized as one of the most
sophisticated housing finance systems in the world (IMF 2006). The mortgage
system remains highly competitive in present day capital markets, as evidenced by
the size of the mortgage bond market relative to county size (Chong 2010). By April
2014 international investors held 45 % of all Danish bonds.1
The paper takes its point of departure in the legal and specific foundation of
credit arrangements, while collateral of mortgage intermediaries is mentioned
briefly, because the security backing mortgage deeds determines the quality of
collateral pools, a critical issue in current negotiations on future international
financial regulations, Basel III and CRD IV.2
Mortgaging in Denmark is governed by the ‘Mortgage-Credit loans and
Mortgage-Credit Bonds etc. Act’ (in brief the Mortgage Credit Act,3 MCA).
Mortgage credit issued by the specialized mortgage banks (originally mortgage
credit associations) are only issued against a registered interest on the real estate in
the legal property register pursuant to the MCA §2. The mortgage contract
constitutes the document of registration (mortgage deed), and functions as well as
1 VP Securities, 2014, VP.indikator Beholdninger, Link file http://www.plan.aau.dk/Users/knh/
Downloads/Beholdning%20(1).pdf
2 BIS, Bank for International Settlements, www.bis.org, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Basel
III, CRD IV, see opinions at http://www.realkreditraadet.dk/Current_issues/New_international_rules_
(Basel_III_-_CRD_IV).aspx.
3 The first mortgage credit act of 1850 to current versions, Consolidating Act no. 1261 of 15 November
2010, http://www.finanstilsynet.dk/en/Regler-og-praksis/Translated-regulations/Acts.aspx.
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the debtor’s promissory note (Spang-Hanssen 2009). In this manner a registered
mortgage deed represents both a (personal) contract between the lender and the
borrower, and an (impersonal) property interest.
Collateral performance will be explored with reference to principles and
practices of mortgaging, property rights, and to the related institutional
arrangements:
In Sect. 2 the basic ideas and historic roots of the mortgage finance system are
outlined with a focus on the securitization principle, risk profile, organization and
the mortgage market in Denmark.
In Sect. 3 observations are made on the performance of the Danish mortgage
system during previous chocks and formative market events like the economic crisis
in the 1930’s, urbanization, integration into the European community and the recent
global financial crisis.
The discussion in Sect. 4 focuses on different dimensions of collateral security
and the robustness of the mortgage finance system achieved through its particular
blend of regulation, organization and securitization technique within a market
paradigm.
Conclusions are summarized in Sect. 5 on the incentive structures and on the
safeguards that created the preconditions for high collateral performance.
2 A brief introduction to the Danish mortgage finance system
2.1 Mortgage credit associations and their successors, mortgage banks
The long history of the finance system permits analysis of questions on mortgage
credit in context during different economic development phases (Andersen 2011;
Møller and Nielsen 1997).
The first Danish mortgage credit association dates back to 1797, when an
association of lenders was established in order to raise capital for reconstruction
after a devastating fire in Copenhagen, but remained the only one until the first
mortgage credit act of 1850 opened for establishing mortgage credit associations
across the country. Pursuant to the first mortgage credit act of 1850 mortgage credit
associations were constituted as specialized cooperative enterprises acting as mono-
line market intermediaries owned by the borrowers/members. The mortgage credit
associations were founded on private initiative with few incentives provided by the
state but relied on effective systems of clear, secure and transparent property rights
(Haldrup 2011).
Mortgage credit associations served as non-profit intermediaries predating
private banking in Denmark. Since members (owners) carried joint and several
responsibility for outstanding debt against the mortgage association—in addition to
the collateral backing their individual mortgages—they were in nature conservative.
In this manner the solidarity coverage combined with effective property rights
helped build trust among investors before the existence of a mature financial
infrastructure in the country.
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The mortgage credit associations soon became the dominant mortgage finance
intermediaries in Denmark and have stayed so, today in the form of their modern
successors, the Danish mortgage banks. In 1989 the ownership structure of
mortgage credit associations were transformed into limited companies in order to
comply with EU internal market standards (Andersen 2011). Hereby the solidarity
guarantees were phased out and replaced by other forms of capital coverage. Danish
mortgage banks are still operating as independent, strictly regulated mono-line
businesses, but their organizational structures are getting closer intertwined with
commercial banks.
Other aspects of the original set up have been retained, in particular the balance
principle of securitization, non-callability by the lender, the principle of securing the
collateral through limited loan to value ratios (LTVs),4 and legal provisions on
cautious valuation principles. Registered mortgage interests were (are) supported by
swift and effective debt enforcement with full legal recourse. Danish mortgage
legislation has from the start been designed to protect investors’ interest, and hereby
as well the borrowers’, but recently macro-economic goals were added (Østrup
2011).
Mortgage banks in Denmark finance long term credit of existing property, not
intermediate credit and construction projects. In the fully developed mortgage
markets of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, junior and short term credit is
obtained through composite loan arrangements including bank guarantees.
2.2 The balance principle of securitization of Danish mortgage finance
The balance principle of securitization forms the core of the Danish mortgage
finance system. Loan capital is raised in the capital market through issue of
equivalent amounts of standardized covered bonds (‘‘realkreditobligationer’’) in
large series with a nominal value, currency, duration and interest rate identical to the
loan, see Fig. 1. The bonds are traded on the stock exchange, so that the yield to
maturity is market determined and transparent. The one-to-one relationship between
loan and bonds, ‘match funding’, and the funding mechanism keeps cash flows
simple and protects the financial system against mismatches (IMF 2006).
Standardization at all levels is key to the definition of Danish mortgage bonds as
mass securities.
Each series of mortgage credit loans and covered bonds were/are secured by
associated ‘‘collateral pools’’ of the underlying properties and by fenced-off reserve
funds of a minimum size determined by law. A central trust enhancing feature in the
early mortgage credit associations were members’ solidarity coverage, now replaced
by other types of capital coverage in compliance with EU internal market standards.
Mortgage credit associations5 kept the credit on their balance until maturity, which
induced a healthy market discipline.
4 Translations of financial regulations, http://www.finanstilsynet.dk/en/Regler-og-praksis/Translated-
regulations/Acts.aspx.
5 Since 1989 replaced by specialized mortgage banks, in this paper ‘Mortgage Credit Institutes’ as a term
used for both.
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The securitization process has several advantages for borrowers such as
simplicity, transparency and predictability. Mortgage credit issued by Danish
mortgage banks is non-callable by the lender, but callable by the borrower. Thanks
to the balance principle borrowers have access to early redemption without penalty,
either by early repayment of outstanding debt (at par), or by buying back the
underlying mortgage bonds at market value (Svenstrup and Willemann 2006).
Access to early redemption has given borrowers more competitive credit and higher
mobility. Borrowers are not locked in, when interest rates change and property
prices fall, a counter-cyclical feature. Investors on their side may retreat from their
engagements by selling their bonds. A functioning market is thus vital to all parties
in the credit chain.
Benefits for borrowers and investors arise from standardization of loans/bonds
and mass-securitization, that reduce transaction costs. Borrows and investors are
protected against predatory lending through standard conditions. Economy of scale
is achieved in accordance with the concept of Danish covered bonds being
‘‘Standardized mass debt instruments’’ (MCA §19). Volume is determining for
reducing operational costs and profitability and thereby for credit affordability.
Volume is also a quality seen from an investor perspective, because larger series of
bonds are generally more liquid and attractive for investors (Boyce 2009). More
attractive bonds achieve higher selling rates to the benefit of borrowers, as well. It
follows that the mortgage finance system depends on existence of high volume
demand for matching long term financial assets, typically by institutional investors
such as pension and insurance funds.
Danish mortgage finance institutes cover their operational costs and build own
capital by levying an administrative fee paid by the borrower with each installment,
traditionally in the order of 0.5 % of the outstanding principal of the loan, but on the
increase due to latest international standards incurring higher capital coverage costs.
The charge covers administration costs and building of reserves. Notably, mortgage
credit associations were in principle non-profit organizations operating on market
conditions, and still the funding mechanism limits the profit margin of mortgage
intermediaries.
Fig. 1 The balance principle of securitization (Source IMF 2006, p. 5 adapted by Haldrup 2011)
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Operational losses have generally been relatively low, albeit rising during times
of crisis. In a mature market the low administrative fees can be accredited to
standardization and a considerable economy of scale associated with a competitive
but consolidated business structure. As a result Danish borrowers have access to real
credit at close to capital market costs. Moreover, transaction costs are relatively low
in Denmark by European comparison (Wyman 2003).
A severe threat to the classical balance principle—considered the robust
fundament of the Danish mortgage finance system—is constituted by new
international standards on capital coverage that introduce uncertainty in funding
costs.6 The first steps of adopting international regulations were taken through the
Mortgage Credit Act of 20077 introducing the principles of Special Coverage Credit
and Bonds (SDO, SDRO8). Hereby two levels of LTV are to be respected:
1. Maximum LTV of each credit contract at time of issue (specific), and
2. A continuous and aggregate maximum LTV for all outstanding credit by
collateral pool observed periodically based on market statistics.
If the aggregate level LTV within the collateral pool is exceeded, additional
security has to be provided by the mortgage bank. The new types of mortgage credit
funded by SDOs and SDROs are less transparent and introduce new uncertainty in
funding costs within the mortgage banks, previously unknown to the classical
securitization model. New financial regulations (Basel III) favour government
bonds, a matter of serious concern for the Danish government9 (IMF 2013, Point 32,
p. 12), since they fail to recognize the low-risk nature of Danish mortgage bonds and
their dominant role in the Danish capital market (market value Dec. 2013: 2.440
billion dkk (covered bonds), 483 billion dkk (government bonds), Source: Statistics
Denmark). There are simply not enough government bonds to meet the demand by
institutional investors, who depend on mortgage bonds as liquid and safe securities.
2.3 Risk profile of the Danish mortgage finance system
The risk profile of securitization built on the balance principle is characterized by its
in-built elimination of many risk factors. The currency exchange rate risk is
eliminated, and market participants (borrowers and investors in bonds) take over the
interest rate risks. The cash flow is kept simple, and liquidity risks are minimized by
the match between payment of installments and the payments to the holders of the
bonds (pass-through securities). Stringent legal provisions on maximum LTVs and
appraisal rules serve as preventive measures against losses on outstanding debt in
6 The Association of Danish Mortgage Banks web resources at http://www.realkreditraadet.dk/Current_
issues/New_international_rules_(Basel_III_-_CRD_IV).aspx.
7 Spang-Hanssen 2009, p. 4: Law no. 577 of 6 June 2007 allows foreign credit institutions/banks to issue
‘‘covered bonds’’ similar to ‘‘realkredit-obligationer’’ as implementation of European Union Directive
2006/48/EC, June 14, 2006.
8 ‘Særligt Dækkende Obligation’, SDO (Special coverage bond), and ‘Særligt Dækkende Realkredit
Obligation’, SDRO, (Special coverage mortgage bond).
9 IMF Country Report No. 13/22, January 2013, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr1322.
pdf.
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case of default. Additional layers of security for investors are provided by the MCI
originally through solidarity coverage, reserve funds, own capital and currently
through capital coverage requirements under strict financial supervision as other
financial institutions.10
Holding mortgages to maturity combined with dependency on investors’ trust
creates a sound incentive structure on the side of lenders.
Investors in bonds have a claim against the mortgage credit institute that carries
the credit risk, since it holds the mortgage credit and bonds on its balance sheets
until maturity. On their part borrowers are kept responsible for outstanding debt vis-
a`-vis the lenders through a swift foreclosure process, and access to full legal
recourse. In this manner the securitization model assigns risks and responsibility to
market players inducing a healthy incentive structure.
The overall risk of investors of default by the mortgage credit institution itself is
remote. Investors in mortgage bonds (now) have a preferential status in case of
bankruptcy of the mortgage credit institute, but with a possible exception of one
minor case in 1857 no investors have suffered losses due to bankruptcy of Danish
mortgage credit institutes during the system’s over 200 years’ history. However, the
financial system underwent difficult periods especially in the 1930’s (Haldrup
2011).
Hereby the securitization model peels off layers of risks from the mortgage credit
institute, while also protecting the interests of the market participants. Lower risks
translate into lower interest rates and means lower costs of credit, thus higher
affordability, ceteris paribus. As a result the main risk held by the Danish mortgage
credit institute is the credit risk: if the borrower will (be able to) honour the debt,
and in case of default, if the collateral value is adequate to cover outstanding
mortgage debt, a matter depending on both Loan-To-Value ratios (LTV) and the
property market. As a result the naked relation between mortgage credit and
collateral security backing the credit stands out as a key issue in Danish mortgage
finance.
Historically underwriting was based on collateral value (‘bricks only’) rather than
the profile of the loan applicant (except for exclusion of bad payers). In case of a
property sale the mortgage is callable by the lender pursuant to standard clauses of
mortgage credit contracts. In practice mortgages can be transferred to the buyer
subject to approval by the mortgage institute,11 a feature that reduces transaction
costs. This continued and widespread practice suggests an impersonal nature of
mortgages within certain limits, e.g., that the buyer is not registered as a bad-payer.
As from 1992 formal credit conditions have been tightened to include the credit-
worthiness of applicants (Andersen 2011, p. 179). This shift towards underwriting
the personal debt service capacity now explicitly defines the security backing a loan
as both the income stream of the applicant and the value of the property. In this
manner the case of mortgage deeds underlines their combined nature as credit
contracts and a (dormant) property interest (Mortensen 2010, p. 19), hereby
10 Finanstilsynet, http://www.finanstilsynet.dk/en/Regler-og-praksis.aspx.
11 Often provided subject to a reduction in the outstanding principal, ‘ejerskifteafdrag’, (von Eyben
2002).
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elegantly bridging the distinction between personal and impersonal rights discussed
by Arrun˜ada (2012).
2.4 Recent mortgage market development
Loans and bonds were fairly standardized during the first century of Danish
mortgage credit system, but over time the products offered have diversified. Since
1996 new types of interest re-set mortgage credit (Adjustable Rate Mortgages
(ARMs)) have been introduced and gained a significant market share.
An amendment of the Mortgage Credit Act of 2003 opened for access to Interest
Only Mortgages (IOMs) for a maximum of 10 years, a new credit product swiftly
embraced by the market (Fig. 2). This has—combined with unprecedented low
interest rates—given Danish borrowers access to very cheap credit within the
lending limits of the mortgage credit institutions (Beltoft 2011). General optimism
in the property market fueled borrowing and lending at that time, so in hindsight the
IOMs are seen to have contributed to increased equity withdrawal and enhanced a
property market bobble that bust in 2008 (Scanlon et al. 2008), see Fig. 3.
Although exposed to extreme stress Danish mortgage banks continued to issue
loans and bonds during the financial crisis in 2008–2009, even in September 2008,
when the rest of European mortgage markets were at a standstill. The balance
principle protected the mortgage institutes against cash flow mismatches, and
investors continued acquiring Danish mortgage bonds, that were regarded as secure
and very liquid assets in a turbulent time (Jensen 2010).
The government did intervene in the market with guarantee options offered to
financial institutions (at their cost), but did not subsidize the mortgage market
(Rohde 2011). By lifting restrictions on the portfolios of institutional investors the
pressure on the bond market was eased, so that fire sales of mortgage bonds were
avoided (Jensen 2010), when bonds outperformed shares.
The property markets reacted swiftly, see Fig. 3, and property prices have by
2012 in average fallen back to the pre-bobble level in 2005. Price development
varied depending on sector, location and other factors, thus reinforcing market
segmentation. All owners of property have shouldered some depreciation of
property assets. Many new owners, who entered the real estate market during the
boom, became technically insolvent.
Foreclosure rates rose in 2008, peaked in 2009 and continued at a higher than
usual level. Mortgage banks have suffered higher than usual losses in 2009–2011.12
Losses peaked in 2009, but were still in average a few promille of outstanding credit
following a long period with very low losses.
The SDO–coverage rules in force since 2007 have aggravated the difficulties
faced by mortgage banks by increasing funding costs in the mortgage sector at the
worst possible time (Knøsgaard 2011). In response loan policies were tightened,
hereby illustrating how questions of collateral security affect the market. In any
case, it is evident that the value dimension of collateral security is taking the center
12 Annual reports: Nykredit A/S, Totalkredit A/S, BRF Kredit A/S, Realkredit Danmark A/S, etc. at
company websites.
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stage in mortgage finance, now in a two-tier version: at specific property level at
loan issue, and (continuously) at aggregate level within the collateral pools of each
mortgage credit institute.
Fig. 2 Mortgage Credit Institutes’ domestic lending: outstanding mortgage debt for housing in Denmark
2004–2010, all maturities by type of amortization, DKK Billions, Source: Realkreditforeningen,
Newsletter 20 May 2010. http://www.realkreditforeningen.dk/nyheder/Pages/Nyt/2010/40-pct-
harafdragsfrit-laan-med-variabel-rente.aspx
Fig. 3 Average square meter prices (DKK) of owner occupied homes, Denmark 1992–2012, Source:
The association of Danish mortgage banks; updated March 18, 2013
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As outlined above, the Danish mortgage finance system is strongly regulated,
while the securitization system based on the balance principle is entirely market
based and depends on the functioning of real and capital markets for achieving scale
of economics and liquidity to the benefits of both borrowers and investors in
mortgage bonds. Two hundred years of experience with the Danish mortgage
finance system illustrate the critical role of government in insuring the quality and
enforceability of mortgage collateral, and reducing uncertainty for market players
throughout the entire process, as stated by Renaud (2008, p. 276).
In the following section the nature of safeguards is explored within three
fundamental areas of collateral security: (1) property rights protection, (2) property
appraisal and (3) foreclosure.
3 Observations on security of collateral in Danish mortgage finance
3.1 Property rights protection and mortgages
Throughout its history the Danish mortgage finance system has benefitted from
functioning legislation with supportive administrative systems that have reduced
uncertainty of mortgaging. The Danish legal framework has for centuries provided
protection of both primary and secondary interests in land, and mortgage law has
long been well developed (Tamm 1978, p. 261). Ancient principles of public
announcements of property transactions and on good faith contributed to building
trust in property rights.
A national cadastre was completed by 1844, and as from 1845 the interconnection
between the cadaster and the legal property registry was strengthened by reorganizing
the legal deeds’ protocols using cadastral identifiers as common entries (Kruse and
Philip 1953). General protection of property rights and freedom rights were guaranteed
through the constitution of 1849, hereby opening for development of mortgage credit
associations. Pursuant to the first mortgage credit act (1850) and later versions,
mortgage credit (through mortgage credit associations) was provided only against a
security interest in the legal property register. The constitutive act of a mortgage is
registration, and the credit contract also serves as the mortgage deed (Mortensen 2010).
Mortgaging is supported by a long and deep tradition of practice, e.g., on definition of
priorities of mortgages with fixed positions according to time of registration, unless
otherwise agreed, a feature that eases remortgaging.
Over time the legal registry underwent modernization, both in respect to clarification
of principles and organisation of the legal property registry and registration procedures,
but the main reform took place in 1926 with the explicit purpose of strengthening the
mortgage credit market. The reform (prepared by the scholar, F. Vinding Kruse)
reconciled the law of obligations and the law on property to the effect that mortgaging in
Denmark is simpler than in German law (Kruse and Philip 1953).
The registration of property act 192613 included provisions on e.g.:
13 Current real property registration act, (‘Tinglysningsloven’ hereafter TL), LBK nr 158, 09/03/2006,
https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/r0710.aspx?id=2031.
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• Compliance with the principles of publicity, and clarification of the legal effects
of registration, including state guarantee of registered property rights and
principles of good faith in the registry;
• Securing the processes of registration of interests in real property under
conveyancing;
• Ordering the contents of the registry on each property in sections, including a
section on mortgage interests;
• Clarifying the extent of security interests backing mortgages as including
insurance sums, fixtures, etc. (TL §38), and associated production factors of
commercial property (TL §§ 37);
• Protection against eroding the value of the collateral through property mutations,
etc.;
• Strict coordination and consistency between the cadastre and the legal registry.
Consequently rights in real property must be registered to achieve protection
against third party, and the time of registry generally defines priorities of registered
rights (first in time, best in right) unless otherwise agreed among the concerned
holders of rights (von Eyben 2002).
The principles of the legal reform of 1926 were so meticulously prepared that
few adjustments of principles have been required since then—despite an ever
increasing volume and complexity of mortgage credit (Olsen 2008). The indemnity
coverage for errors of registration paid out by the state over the years has been
negligible compared to market size.14
Standardization of mortgage deed formats was introduced with the legal reform
in 1926. The standard mortgage credit contract (Mortgage Deed Format B15) is brief
and includes clauses on legal recourse, non-callability by the lender (subject to due
debt service, etc.), payment conditions, insurance coverage, etc. In this manner
standardization of mortgages and registration of mortgage deeds in Denmark
supports collateral efficiency, as measured in terms of simplicity, transparency,
rapidity and costs (EMF 2007).
Mortgagees’ interests are protected against erosion during transactions over the
lifetime of a mortgage. The standard mortgage credit agreement was—and still is—
conditional on the borrower’s continued maintenance of the collateral. Coordinated
legal provisions of the registration of property act and the cadastral law protect the
parties during the critical steps of conveyancing and, in case of property mutations,
against depreciation of the underlying collateral value. Only insignificant mutations
or adjustments of boundaries can be conducted without consultations with
mortgagees (TL§23).
The cadastre and legal registry underwent a comprehensive technical reform
during 1980–2010 aimed at providing advanced and fully electronic services. By
September 8, 2009, the whole system (including 75 million A4-pages of documents)
14 http://www.domstol.dk/om/talogfakta/statistik/Tinglysning/Pages/default.aspx.
15 Tinglysningsbekendtgørelsen; http://www.themis.dk/synopsis/docs/Lovsamling/Tinglysningsbekend
tgoerelsen.html#Kapitel 3 Dokumenter m.v., Pantebrevsformular B (English translation available in
Spang-Hanssen, 2009, Appendix E).
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had been fully converted to digital form and e-services, very much in response to
needs of the financial sector.
Owners and professional users now have access to self-service functions with
instant registration of standard transactions such as mortgage deeds. Hereby
transaction time was reduced to 1 day for standard transactions,16 and costs of more
expensive intermediate financing was saved. The electronic system is open for
inquiries by the general public, thus creating a fully transparent regime of property
rights.
Moreover, access to property market information has been eased: Sales prices
have since 1992 been available in public access portals. New e-services extract and
integrate public property data for use in transactions17 in support of transparency in
the property market. Asymmetry in the property and mortgage market has been
minimized, hereby reducing the problems discussed by (Arrun˜ada 2012). Protection
of the quality of collateral is further protected through functioning building
regulations, etc.
Activities in the Danish mortgage market have been particular high compared to
other mature mortgage markets due to borrowers’ access to early redemption
without penalty,18 so that the high mortgage market activity has generated
considerable state revenues (fees and transfer taxes). Investments in the legal
infrastructure underpinning mortgage law have paid generously back in more than
one way. Financial experts emphasize that clarity and transparency of the legal
registry of property rights and efficient compulsory sale procedures have added to
the protection of investors in Danish mortgage bonds (Golin 2006, p. 112).
On its side the mortgage system provided compelling incentives for registration
and since the mid twentieth century also for compliance with planning and building
regulations. These incentives combined with non-prohibitive transactions costs
mean that informality or under-declaration was—and is—not an option in Denmark.
Therefore, it is suggested that mortgage finance is contributing to strengthening of
the legal registration system’s sustainability over time, as much as mortgage finance
was dependent on the legal registry in the first place (Haldrup 2011).
In conclusion, security of collateral backing mortgage credit issued by the Danish
mortgage banks was built through a consistent and functioning legal framework:
• Mortgage credit rests on century old practices, and on stable and clear
registration principles, now modernized;
• Mortgage contracts/deeds are standardized, hereby protecting the parties of
mortgage contracts and facilitating the function of mortgage bonds as liquid
mass securities;
• Safeguards of mortgages against erosion of the underlying collateral value
during the lifetime of the credit contract;
16 http://www.tinglysningsretten.dk/tinglysning/talogfakta/sagsbehandlingstid/Pages/default.aspx.
17 DIADEM, http://www.mbbl.dk/ejendomsdata/ejendomsdata-i-anvendelse/ejendomsdatarapporten/
ejendomsoplysninger-i-diadem.
18 Early redemption of outstanding debt occur by either buying back the corresponding bonds at market
rates, or by repaying outstanding capital at par.
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• Legal risks are practically zero for duly registered mortgages that are covered by
state guarantees;
• The property market is fully formal and transparent with public access to rich
information on properties, rights and restrictions, and sales prices;
• Transaction costs have been non-prohibitive to market development.
The evolution of property rights protection in Denmark delivers specific evidence
of their role in economic development (North 1990), and connects property rights
with trust and market development over the long term (Calderon et al. 2002), but
also demystify the process by showing how results were achieved through simple
principles and total coverage of the cadastre and land registries at an early time,
which permitted mortgage markets to benefit from economy of scale already in the
nineteenth century. Later sophistication of the property registration system was to a
large degree driven by the mortgage industry. The cost of digital reforms of the legal
registry has been more than outweighed by revenues and by positive externalities
generated to the economy at large.
3.2 Security of collateral, valuation and leverage
The value dimension of collateral security depends on the combined effect of value
assessments at loan issue, maximum LTVs, amortization and later market
development. A key concern for collateral security is defining maximum LTVs as
a buffer against fluctuating real estate prices without jeopardizing the functioning of
the market. Whether regulations on maximum LTVs have the intended effect on
lending depends on the practices of valuations. Early observers saw that ‘‘Valuation
is the Achilles’ heel of mortgage credit system’’, and noted that restraint is
particularly difficult in economic growth periods (Haldrup 2011).
The first mortgage credit act (1850) permitted issue of annuity loans on very long
term—up to 60 years—within a maximum of 60 % of the property value, against
first priority security interests (Andersen 2011). The mortgage credit act of 1936
codified the provision of secondary mortgages within a LTV ratio of 75 %. These
conditions for senior mortgage credit prevailed until the 1960’s, after which lending
limits were raised and duration of credit abbreviated. The 1970 mortgage credit act
defined a max duration of 30 years and varying maximum LTVs dependent on type
of property (Haldrup 2011).
The mortgage credit act was subject to numerous changes between 1975 and
1993, when credit rationing served as a financial policy instrument. Changes
concerned maximum LTVs, credit duration, and amortization schemes differenti-
ated in respect to intended use of credit and property type.19 Since 1993 regulations
on LTVs and loan duration have been stable, but amortization options were
expanded through invention of new mortgage products (ARMs, IOMs).
From the beginning mortgage credit associations recruited a local network of
assessors among reputable men in touch with the local property markets, typically
farmers and owners/borrowers themselves. The duty of local assessors involved
19 Annual Report of the Association of Danish Mortgage Banks, 1986, p. 55.
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‘keeping an eye’ on the state of the collateral. The original organisational model of
mortgage credit associations presumably served a disciplining function, since
members/owners had reasons to be risk averting when subject to solidarity
coverage.
Appraisal has since long been conducted by real estate professionals. However,
assessing market value as a basis for lending remains a critical issue dependent on
competence, incentives, and ethics in the whole valuation set-up, e.g., to avoid
undue interference between credit sales activities and assessment.
The appraisal principles for mortgage lending pursuant to the 2010- mortgage
credit act (MCA 2010, §§ 10–14) build on (conservative) market value under
consideration of potential market risks disregarding special conditions and scarcity.
Market price20 (dwellings and leisure houses) refers to a likely price paid by a
prudent buyer for a similar property in the area, sold within 6 months of
announcement. The state of the pledged property is to be inspected inside and
outside by the assessor, and assessments must include assets in concordance with
the extent of the property rights as defined in the legal property registration act (TL
§§ 37 and 38). In practice valuation benefits from availability of rich property data
and true market price statistics in public domain (https://www.ois.dk), as well as
market information recorded by each mortgage credit institute.
Valuation for mortgage lending is further regulated in respect to new
international regulations21 and subject to quality control by the Financial
Supervisory Authority. While maximum LTVs are defined by law, lenders retain
some flexibility in valuation, due to the nature of assessment.
Valuation is becoming even more important in mortgage finance given the latest
developments of mortgage products without amortization of the principal for shorter
or longer periods, as well as the introduction of SDO and SDRO-loans (and bonds)
in 2007, that require recurring valuations over the lifetime of the credit to be
performed on a statistical basis by the mortgage banks for determination of their
(dynamic) capital coverage requirements.
While uncertainty of assessing current property value can be reduced by use of
good market information, the volatility of market value over time is a major risk
factor in mortgage lending given market fluctuations caused by macro-economic
cycles. The Danish mortgage market went through a boom and bust during the first
decade of the twenty-first century. After the bust home owners suffered loss of
equity and more borrowers were locked in. Hardest hit were borrowers who entered
the property market or exploited all credit options during the boom.
Hereby it was confirmed that a general difficulty in an active mortgage market is
restraining mortgage lending during growth periods with rapid appreciation of
assets.
Local market values are as well impacted over time by large scale structural
changes in society. In this respect the Danish mortgage credit system reduces risks
20 Other categories of properties are subject to other valuation principles.
21 Bekendtgørelse nr. 687 af juni 2007, Bekendtgørelse om værdiansættelse af pant og la˚n i fast ejendom
som stilles til sikkerhed for udstedelse af særligt dækkede realkreditobligationer og særligt dækkede
obligationer.
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through its composition and size of collateral pools characterized by diversity (and
dynamics) backing each bond series. In contrast to the collateral pools of the
Mortgage Backed Securities in the US (Nadler 2005), the Danish collateral pools
are large and inhomogeneous hereby reducing the exposure to particular local
property markets.
Summing up mortgage law and valuation for mortgage lending in Denmark is
contributing to collateral security through features such as:
• Mortgage law regulates maximum LTVs and valuation principles; and valuation
for mortgage lending is subject to supervision by the Financial Supervisory
Authority (FSA);
• Danish mortgage banks only provide mortgages against registered charges on
existing properties hereby eliminating development risks;
• Valuation is supported by rich property data and reliable, current market
statistics;
• Early redemption gives borrows a possibility to partially offset market
fluctuations;
• Diversity of collateral pools backing Danish mortgage bonds provides a level of
protection against location risks.
Principles of valuation for mortgage lending follow recommendations by
European Mortgage Federation (EMF 2012, p. 9–11), on regulatory framework,
transparency and methodology. Restraint in growth periods remains a critical issue,
since appreciated property values open for equity withdrawal and higher economic
expectations, a pattern also seen in other mortgage markets. As a result
overoptimistic borrowing and lending occurs at intervals.
3.3 Security of collateral and foreclosure
Security of collateral is put to an ultimate test in the case of default, when a lender
needs to recover the outstanding debt through the asset value or the income flow of
the property.
Effective debt enforcement was put in place with the first mortgage credit act of
1850. Mortgage associations were then authorized to apply out of court enforcement
proceedings (Andersen 2011, p. 84). Full legal recourse was previously combined
with tight social control in small communities. Now foreclosure is executed by the
local bailiff court according to principles that date back to legal revision of the
Danish Civil Procedure Code in 1977 (Spang-Hanssen 2009). Provisions on the
borrowers’ position and on enforcement in case of default are set down in the
standard mortgage contracts.
Debt enforcement is effective through functioning legal systems combined with
complete and reliable legal and administrative registers, such as the Central
Personal Register (CPR), register of enterprises (CVR), address system, etc. In case
of arrears the main instruments of enforcement are consultations with defaulting
borrowers, preventive sales, repossessions, or eventually foreclosure. If the arrears
cannot be remedied, and the case is pursued through the legal system, the law
recognizes that a defaulting borrower may need assistance. The judge is given
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authority to guide borrowers, to call pre-auction meetings, and in special cases to
appoint legal aid. More than half of the cases are withdrawn after initiating legal
procedures (www.domstol.dk).
An auction is a necessary, ultimate step of enforcement. The option of
foreclosure is unattractive both for lenders and borrowers due to transaction costs,
risks of low auction bids, and for the borrower—in addition to the traumatizing
consequences of losing a home or business-, the personal debt and the registration in
the register of bad payers.22 The overall goal of the legal process is to realizing the
concerned property at the highest possible price, preferably in the open market or—
if it fails—at an auction, to the benefit of all parties.
Arrears are swiftly pursued to avoid (further) erosion of the assets concerned.
Standard mortgage agreements define payment schedules and give a respite of
7 days after the due date for installments and interest, after which a formal notice
must be sent to the debtor prior to pursuing the claim through forced sale
proceedings. The official court process is standardized and can be initiated after
minimum 14 days, and elapsed time from formal notice to foreclosure is in average
about 6 months.23
The bailiff court is responsible for announcements of auctions in the Danish
gazette, on the Internet and in local news media for attracting prospective bidders.24
Information on the property is documented in a standardized and comprehensive
report designed to help bidders in taking informed decisions during the auction, e.g.,
by including all registered interests in the property in order of priority rank. The
auction information sheet is a key document of any auction in combination with
standard auction conditions (Spang-Hanssen 2009).
In principle the highest bidder at an auction takes over the property ‘‘as is’’ at the
moment of hammer stroke without warranty. The winning bid is likely to be below
market price due to the special circumstances of the sale. If the bids are not
satisfactory, a claimant may request a second auction to be held, if covering the
additional auction costs. The revenue of the bid accrues to the holders of rights in
the order of priority of their interests, irrespective of who was the auction-claimant,
and if all claims are satisfied, the remaining sum goes to the borrower.
The auction buyer can demand that the court strike out those claimant-rights that
were not embraced by the bid by order to the Legal property registry (Spang-
Hanssen 2009). Claimants not covered by the final bid have access to full legal
recourse (subject to clauses of the credit contract).
Despite a standardized and speedy foreclosure process, the parties are likely to
incur added costs compared to an open market transaction. The risk for the debtor
and the creditors is a hammer stroke at a very low bid. The mortgage credit
22 Experian, see http://www.experian.dk/rki/index.html. The number of bad payers registered in the
RKI–register was about 5 % of the adult population ultimo 2012, owing in average about 65000 dkk/
person (about 8700 Euro).
23 An overview of the foreclosure process is available at the association of Danish Mortgage Banks,
http://www.realkreditraadet.dk/Forbrugerforhold/Manglende_betaling/Udl%C3%A6g_og_tvangsauktion.
aspx.
24 See the Danish gazette, www.statstidende.dk; and real estate sales sites: www.tvangsauktioner.dk,
www.itvang.dk.
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institute(s) are likely to be among the bidders to defend their collateral, and
depending on the bids, they may choose to minimize their loss by buying on the
auction and selling later at a convenient time. The market mechanism may then help
the patient auction buyer. The number of taken over properties by mortgage banks
serves as a market indicator.25
Systemic elements are evident in the occurrence of foreclosures. Periods with
higher than usual foreclosure levels were triggered by events in the overall
economy, but the Danish mortgage finance system has proven robust through crisis
as indicated by historic evidence.
During the economic crisis of the 1930s special crisis legislation in 1932–1936
eased the pressure on borrowers and on the mortgage credit associations by giving
access to a 2 year derogation of mortgage payments for farmers, who saw steeply
falling incomes. The mortgage credit associations endured and counted their losses
in an average of 1 promille per year of outstanding nominal debt (Glud 1951,
pp. 249–250; Møller and Nielsen 1997, p. 114). However, borrowers suffered.
Other waves of foreclosure occurred in the beginning of the 1980s following the
oil crisis, but the pressure on the mortgage market was then eased by inflation. Later
towards the end of the 1980’s a serious wave of foreclosure hit, when the Danish
government used credit rationing as an instrument in the so-called ‘Potato diet’
(Chong 2010). The introduction of shorter amortization periods and other
restrictions in 1986 had a strong impact on the property market at a time when
unemployment rates also rose. Easing of lending policies among different mortgage
credit associations in their competition for market shares contributed to the crisis
(Andersen 2011). Following that sobering experience (and a new business structure
pursuant to the mortgage credit act of 1989), the mortgage banks introduced
underwriting of the applicants’ personal debt service ability in 1992.
At the outset of the global financial crisis in 2008 foreclosure levels went up
immediately, but did not reach the levels experienced around 1990, see Fig. 4. Some
market segments suffered more than others, and first time buyers were particularly
exposed, if they entered the market during the peak in 2005–2007 (Haldrup and
Staunstrup 2014).
Irrespectively, overall foreclosure rates in the housing sector were still low on an
international scale and were also dwarfed by foreclosure rates during the crisis
around 1990. Swift reactions to crisis signals were seen in the mortgage industry
with tightening of lending practices and adoption of international consumer
protection standards on responsible lending and borrowing (EMF 2009). The days
of allocating mortgages based on the principle of ‘bricks only’ were definitely over.
This did not cure their portfolios retroactively, but losses were avoided as long as
borrowers keep servicing their debt, which is generally the case, unless unemploy-
ment or other misfortune strikes. Arrears in mortgage credit for housing were
typically been between 1–3 % between 1995 and 2008, but rose to 5.5 % in 2009.
Losses realized by mortgage credit institutions accounted to in average a few % pro
annum. The largest Danish mortgage bank, Nykredit, carried losses of between 1–3%
25 Statistics at www.rkr.dk.
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during 2009–2011, (Jensen 2012). The number of repossessed residential properties
were in the same period between 0 and 0.5 %.
In this manner, a long historical record provides evidence of effective debt
enforcement, relatively low levels of foreclosure as well as limited losses in Danish
mortgage institutes compared to outstanding credit. Borrowers are subject to
effective foreclosure proceedings and full legal recourse that combined with legal
practices provides no escape for debt in Denmark, neither on the short nor long
term, but lenders may still incur losses due to incapable borrowers. This forms part
of the incentive structure for both borrowers and lenders.
In summary debt enforcement in Denmark is effective through
• Complete and functioning registers on legal property interests, and other data
infrastructure;
• Preventive instruments available and effectively used for aiding borrowers in
case of arrears;
• Swift and effective debt enforcement conducted through the local bailiff courts
within about six months;
• Standard regulations on forced sale proceedings and public announcements
thereof;
• Complete information on mortgages and the property provided for prospective
bidders;
• Respecting all claimants in order of priority of their claims;
• Non-full filled claimants have access to full legal recourse (subject to the clause
of the mortgage);
• The auction buyer takes over the property ‘as is’, is secured access to the
property, and can demand mortgages not embraced by the bid annulled in the
legal registry;
Fig. 4 Number of announced forced sales per month, by housing type (seasonally adjusted) 1993–2012,
Denmark, Source: Statistics Denmark
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• Foreclosure remains unattractive for both lenders and borrowers.
It is concluded that regulations and practices on debt enforcement are in
accordance with best practices (EMF 2010).26 Cross country studies on debt
enforcement show that credit dries out, if enforcement is ineffective (Djankov et al.
2008). A functioning mortgage market in Denmark with relatively low foreclosure
rates over time suggest that safeguards of mortgaging have largely been adequate,
even if collateral security was impacted by macroeconomic tides. Evidence suggests
that effective debt enforcement has been a necessary price paid by few for
developing a deep mortgage market with affordable credit to many.
4 Discussion of the general nature of collateral security
4.1 Setting standards of collateral security
A number of specific factors mentioned in preceding chapters were shown to have
influenced the security backing lending through the specialized mortgage institutes
in Denmark. In the following wider issues of collateral are discussed in search of
underlying mechanisms of collateral performance.
Danish owners of property have enjoyed wide access to real credit, because
emphasis from the beginning was put on security of collateral and enforcement—
not bankability of the applicant. Hereby the Danish mortgage credit associations
originally opened for access to mortgage credit irrespective of status and age,
permitting able citizens to work their way to improving their standard of living and
improving their housing standards (Haldrup 2011). Lower income households were
able to acquire their own home, but the system was not designed to cater for citizens
without income or assets. In recent decades, owner-occupied housing is supple-
mented with a variety of private rental housing options and social housing for
households preferring or needing to rent (Vestergaard 2002).
Over time Danish mortgage institutes have provided mortgage lending at
competitive costs, which has stimulated demand for mortgages from buyers and
owners of real property in Denmark. Danish borrowers have for long had a large
appetite for mortgage credit, a matter lamented by Danish mortgage credit experts
since 1888. When the maximum lending limits were exploited, it follows that
borrowers with high leverage were more vulnerable to depreciation of assets.
Setting standards for collateral security in mortgage law is a political choice with
profound effects on the housing market. Provisions on e.g., maximum LTVs serve
as well as protection of investors and borrowers, but are as well seen as protecting
financial stability (Østrup 2011). Between 1966 and 1992 tightening of mortgage
credit was used in an attempt to curb consumption, but with negative side effects
such as the blossoming of more expensive financing options.27 Chong (2010)
emphasized the positive effects of restraining equity withdrawal, but use of credit
26 European Mortgage Federation position on Foreclosure, http://www.hypo.org/Content/default.
asp?PageID=433.
27 Annual report of the Association of Mortgage Banks, 1986, p. 20.
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rationing is now regarded as a too strong policy tool due to its negative effect on
property values.
Striking a balance between security and operations of the market through e.g.,
requirements for own equity at property acquisition is of importance especially for
market entrants, typically young households. In comparison the Germany mortgage
finance system sets high requirements for own equity, combined with assessment of
a stable ‘mortgage lending value’ below market value, which is resulting in a
conservative mortgage market (Tolckmitt 2012).
In contrast low lending standards in the US mortgage market resulted in
inadequate collateral behind mortgage backed securities as revealed once the bobble
bust in 2007, hereby causing collateral damage to the economy as widely
documented. Moreover, moral hazards were exposed at all levels of the mortgage
finance system (Jaffee 2008). The policy of ‘affordable housing’ through lowering
credit standards turned out to come with a gigantic price tag.
In this light it is suggested that Danish mortgage law seems to have hit a balance
between opening for access to credit and establishing adequate levels of security of
collateral without being too restrictive, but it is a continuing challenge to maintain
that balance.
4.2 Security of collateral and incentive structures
The overall robustness of the mortgage finance system is both a matter of design and
of practices.
The original social construct of associations in finance is not unique, but the
Danish system gained its strength through the securitization model based on the
balance principle with its incentive structure (Lea 2011, p. 18), that allocates risks
and responsibilities to market participants in a disciplining manner: The mortgage
credit associations kept debt on their balance sheets to expiry, borrowers had equity
at stake, the system was by design transparent etc. The balance principle is robust
per se, but the performance also depends on the safeguards of the underlying
collateral pools, reserves and market trust in the securities.
From time to time, too optimistic lending and borrowing was exposed later in a low
market with repercussions for lenders and not the least borrowers subject to loss of equity
and—in cases of forced sales—lost homes. Market forces served as a forceful educator,
when the parties were exposed to un-cushioned effects of market booms and busts.
Initially consequences of foreclosure were rough. Later in the second half of the twentieth
century alternative housing options and development of social security programs have
suspended a basic, albeit unattractive, safety net under unfortunate households. In this
way the balance principle combined with effective debt enforcement built a sound, but
severe, incentive structure inducing responsible borrowing and lending.
It is a question what other factors made the Danish mortgage associations
succeed, while scandals hit the Savings and Loans associations in the US in the
1980’s and 90’s (Ferguson 2009). Spang-Hanssen (2009) attributes the long and
unblemished history of specialized lending in Denmark since 1851 to the legal and
institutional framework. Here it is suggested that the securitization model based on
the balance principle was as important as a functioning legal system in creating a
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healthy incentive structure that strengthened security of collateral beyond the word
of law.
It seems reasonable to assume that that behavior of each party in the credit chain
impact on the performance of the mortgage credit system. For these reasons, deep-
rooted social norms and ethics might have played a role in avoiding devastating
scandals or fraud, which could have put the system at risk. More factors could
possibly have been decisive, e.g., the organizational setup of the mortgage
intermediaries, and a non-corrupt culture, but the question of causality is open for
discussion. The ability of private individuals of building mortgage credit
associations based on common and reciprocal interests in the nineteenth century
did provide economic benefits to members as well as the overall economy (Glud
1951), but if or to what extent the economic outcome can be accredited to social
capital merits further study (Knack and Keefer 1997).
Remarkably, the finance system is fully market based and functioned for most of
its long history without much government supervision. As early as 1910 outstanding
mortgage debt had reached a level above 75 % of GNP (Abildgren 2006), but there
was practically no state supervision, which was only fully introduced after 1980,
and by inclusion of bankruptcy provisions of mortgage banks in a consolidated
financial business act of 2003.28 Their prior self-regulating nature is interpreted here
as evidence of the Danish mortgage model being built on aligned incentive
structures, asset quality, and principles of transparency, in accordance with (later)
international recommendations (BIS, Bank for International Settlements 2011).
4.3 Features of the mortgage market and commitment mechanisms
Since modern economies are credit based (Sheng 1998; Ferguson 2009), and
collateral security is a core issue of all mortgage finance, it follows that ‘collateral’
serves as a critical link between real and capital markets. Mortgages bring property
rights into intimate contact with the macro-economy, as already observed by
Kruse in 1923 (Kruse and Philip 1953), and mortgage credit is not neutral to market
value, as can be observed in the Danish case as sensitivity of the property market to
mortgage finance. Collateral value is hinged on market value, and the financing
system itself is affecting the property market. Therefore, a definition of collateral
security includes recursive features despite its firm legal base.
The Danish mortgage market is active and deep, so any changes in the mortgage
credit act or in the property market is instantly testing the strength of the mortgage
finance system. Events along the 200 years history of the Danish mortgage credit
system showed how leaps in development occurred with introduction of new
legislation, and also how the regulatory framework profoundly affected the business
structures and the market, but not always in predicted ways.
On one side every economic crisis has tested the mortgage finance system and
triggered thorough reviews and revisions of the legal framework. On the other side
28 Finanstilsynet (Financial Supervisory Authority), http://www.finanstilsynet.dk/en/Regler-og-praksis/
Translated-regulations/Acts.aspx.
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mortgage law is a colossal force in the capital market, confirming that mortgage
markets are the basis for other markets (Ferguson 2009).
Legal changes in the Mortgage Credit Act, that might seem minor, have shown to
have had high impact on the mortgage and property markets, although many other
factors were at play, e.g., tax incentives, inflation and employment rates. In the
1980ies credit rationing contributed to a market slump [Hoffmeyer and Jelved in
(Jørgensen et al. 1997)], while opening for Interest Only Mortgages (IOM) in 2003
in hindsight is seen as having contributed to a price hike (Beltoft 2011).
Real assets were rapidly depreciated when negative economic signals hit the
property market, see Fig. 3. After the bobble bust in 2008, the Danish mortgage
system withstood an average depreciation of property values of in average 20 %
(2009–2011) in a deep mortgage market with outstanding mortgage debt for housing
at about 100 % of GDP. The foreclosure rates grew, but despite many borrowers
becoming technically insolvent, the default level was still relatively low and
counted in single digit promilles. The occurrence of foreclosures in Denmark is
dwarfed by similar data experienced in the US both during the crisis in the 1930’s
and the crisis after 2007. Statistics show that Danish borrowers generally continue
servicing their debt even in case of negative equity, presumably because foreclosure
is an unattractive alternative.
In general the development of the Danish mortgage finance system is confirming
the overall understanding of the institutional commitment mechanism as funda-
mental to building mortgage markets as described by Fratianni and Spinelli (2006,
p. 259), who defined financial (r)evolution as resting on three pillars: (1) The
institutional mechanism through which the debtor commits not to renege on debt;
(2) The public bank; and (3) Innovations in financial instruments and markets. North
and Weingast (1989) established the causal link between the credible commitment
of government in upholding property rights and capital market development in
seventeenth century England, which could also be a fitting interpretation of the
development path of Danish mortgage banks.
In a current context a strong commitment structure embedded in the legal
infrastructure has enhanced, it is argued, the performance and robustness of the
Danish mortgage finance system based on the balance system of securitization, by
averting a contamination of the combined mortgage and property markets
potentially resulting in downward destructive market spirals, even during deep
crisis. In this manner a strong commitment mechanism serves as an intangible and
indispensable dimension of collateral security, whereas the (market) value relative
to outstanding debt represents numerical aspects of collateral security, seemingly
quantitative and tangible, but in part elusive.
In conclusion collateral security depends on functioning real estate markets,
mortgage markets impact on property markets and thus collateral value, and market
risks (and opportunities) over the lifetime of mortgage credit are in the first instance
carried by the parties of the mortgage contracts, but may eventually have negative or
positive spill-over effects on the overall economy. With such awesome, intercon-
nected forces at play, a strong commitment mechanism embedded in the legal
infrastructure serves as an indispensable safeguard for each and every mortgage
deed, as well as a general protection stimulating mortgage market development. It is
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argued that such protection was in place in Denmark in the nineteenth century,
which permitted development of a deep mortgage market already in the beginning
of the twentieth century (Abildgren 2006), when outstanding mortgage debt reached
over 75 % of GDP (1910) before mortgage intermediaries were subject to state
supervision.
Based on the above it is concluded by induction that the Danish mortgage finance
system and the legal framework include strong commitment mechanisms that keep
borrowers servicing their debt as evidenced by statistics on defaults during crisis.
4.4 Collateral security and the role of government in mortgage market
development
Clear evidence of the role of property rights for mortgage finance development is
provided by economists, who see the development of secure property rights at large
and of primary markets as a precondition for development of mortgage finance
systems (Lea et al. 2004; Sheng et al. 2006). In Denmark the complete and
transparent legal property register (supported by effective debt enforcement) has for
long provided a strong basis for mortgaging, since 2009 with instant digital
registration.
Markets depend on governments to build an adequate legal infrastructure that
eliminate legal risks and establish transparency, but as can be demonstrated in the
Danish case, this was an investment that paid back in more than one way, partly
directly through the transaction fees collected, partly through positive externalities
of a low risk system. Present day investors (Boyce 2009) emphasize how covered
bonds based on special legislation and on the balance principle, create an attractive
finance system both for investors and borrowers with stabilizing effects on the
economy.
Private initiatives and private organizations played a decisive role in building the
Danish mortgage system, as the history of the mortgage associations attests. The
Danish mortgage associations made it easier for the smallest land owners in rural
areas to access the international capital market, than for a large entrepreneur to
achieve access to the stock exchange, because the latter required substantial capital
(Glud 1951, pp. 146–7). Glud also observed that the growth of the mortgage credit
associations combined with the cooperative movement had contributed to a leveling
of incomes and assets, and thus been of importance for the social structure in
Denmark characterized by low in-equality.
Mortgage credit associations arose as spontaneous private organizations to
meeting needs for institutionalized credit in an already active primary mortgage
market (Haldrup 2011). Mortgage credit associations can be seen as a form of grown
organization originally based on non-profit principles, but acting on market
conditions, that eventually capitalized a large share of the national economy. Over
more than a century they achieved an importance probably far beyond what their
founding fathers could have imagined (Hayek 1982).
Market risks cannot be eliminated, but as was argued above, risks were assigned
to market players in a disciplinary manner, although e.g., location risks and time of
market entry over the long run produce winners and losers in the market, that may
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seem unjust in the individual case. On the other hand economic risks provide
inducements for market participants to anticipate impeding changes as accurately as
possible (Hayek 1982, p. 284). Over time and in average, owners of property profit
as well from having a share in the property market, since property values evolve
over the long term grossly proportional to GDP (Møller and Nielsen 1997).
The Danish mortgage banks have proven competitive in an open international
market as evidenced by their high market share of about 90 % of long term real
credit in Denmark in contrast to many other European mortgage markets dominated
by general banks (Suarez and Vassallo 2004). In 2011 total lending by mortgage
credit institute amounted to 134 % of GDP (Jensen 2012), of which residential
mortgage debt represented 100.9 % of GDP, one of the highest ratios in EU only
exceeded by the Netherlands (EMF Hypostat 2011).29 Mortgage bonds dominate the
Danish capital market (about 60 %), but they also play a prominent role in the
European market with the second largest share (19 % in 2011) of all mortgage
bonds in the EU, only exceeded by Spain with 20.3 % of total outstanding covered
bonds (HYPOSTAT 2011).
A new risk at institutional level to the Danish mortgage finance system was
introduced with international regulations of financial institutions30 disregarding the
robust nature of Danish mortgage finance. Although introduced with the purpose of
reducing risks, it is seen as resulting in instable and higher funding costs, that
undermine the transparency and robustness of the Danish mortgage finance system.
Andersen (Andersen 2011) even described the Basel II requirements as ‘intellectual
hybris’, since there is little evidence of what precisely should be the magic adequate
capital coverage (Andersen 2011, p. 275). Thus, the medicine designed to cure
problems in other financial systems, is putting the Danish mortgage finance system
out of balance (Jensen 2011). Nevertheless, Danish mortgage banks have adopted
various strategies of complying with new capital coverage requirements in order to
mitigate their negative impact.
How collateral security depends on market development was demonstrated in full
with a significant depreciation of property values following the financial crisis in
2008. Danish borrowers suffered from loss of equity, but at the same time benefitted
from unprecedented low interest rates due to the low risk nature of Danish mortgage
bonds considered a safe-haven in the European capital market during a turbulent
time, Fig. 5. This allowed borrowers to offload debt, so with patience a positive
development in the property market could do the rest of the work of reducing
negative equity (Rohde 2013). The Danish mortgage banks withstood the
2008-market chock helped by the government easing of framework conditions
(Rohde 2011), but not through subsidies.
Overall these events confirm the interconnected nature of factors of collateral
security in tandem with the strength of the Danish mortgage finance system. It is
also demonstrating how the price signal serves as a strong and simple indicator of a
29 European Mortgage Federation, HYPOSTAT, http://www.hypo.org/Content/Default.asp?PageID=524.
30 Documentation and position papers at the Association of Danish Mortgage Banks, http://www.
realkreditraadet.dk/Current_issues/New_international_rules_(Basel_III_-_CRD_IV).aspx; And Bank for
International Settlements (BIS), http://www.bis.org/.
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complex phenomenon. The market verdict of the security behind the Danish
mortgage system compared to other systems is positive as reflected in the interest
rate development.
In contrast, the US Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) issuing Mortgage
Backed Securities, Fannie May and Freddie Mac that accounted for 44 % of all
outstanding mortgages in the US in 200831 have failed at a gigantic scale, as
documented by their record of relaxed lending standards that ended in bankruptcy
and a government bailout in 2008, costing taxpayers gigantic sums (Jaffee 2011),
while the negative externalities to the national and global economy are
incommensurable. It has been suggested that their failure originated in an unhealthy
incentive structure of the financing model and low lending standards (Jaffee 2008).
Geanakoplos (2010) argued that economists and the Federal Reserve had for too
long focused on interest rates and ignored collateral, but explaining the root causes
of the scandal remains controversial, as mapped out by the US government
Financial Crisis Inquiery Commission.32 A few facts speak by themselves:
Foreclosure levels in 2009 reached 4.6 % for all mortgages, herof 3.3 and 15.6 %
of prime respectively subprime mortgages (Jaffee 2011). Differences among US
states and market segments showed that legal recourse (Ghent and Kudlyak 2011)
and having own equity at stake lowered incidents of strategic defaults (Guiso et al.
2009).
Albeit massive state subsidies to the GSEs prior to 2008 and beyond, they were
unable to suspend market mechanisms that eventually passed their verdict over the
inflated Mortgage Backed Securities issued without adequate collateral and
safeguards. In this manner events can be understood rather as policy failure than
market failure. Jaffee (2011) has suggested a strategy of abolishing the GSEs and
implement a private market model based on incentives with little government
intervention inspired by European mortgage markets.
Both examples illustrate the centrality of collateral security and the power of the
mortgage market. The Danish case serves as a counterfactual argument against a
widespread perception of market mechanisms and capitalism as undermining
affordable credit. On the contrary the Danish mortgage market has proven capable
(without subsidies) in an open international market of securing wide access to long
term credit that allowed new entrants to the property market without large prior
savings. The findings illustrate the importance of getting the formula right of
government regulations and of building strong property rights with legal
infrastructure that allow the market to function to the benefit of society. While
the formula needs to be constantly adjusted to new challenges, it is suggested that
the collateral safeguards established in the Danish system represent a clever
balance.
31 Fannie Mae outstanding Mortgage Debt 3.1 Trillion USD in December 2008, Total outstanding
mortgage debt in the US 12.1 Trillion USD; http://www.fanniemae.com/resources/file/ir/pdf/proxy-
statements/form10k_022609.pdf, p. 7; Freddie Mac outstanding mortgage debt 2,2 Trillion USD in
December 2008, see http://www.freddiemac.com/investors/er/pdf/10k_031109.pdf, page 61. Low quality
loans made up about 34 % of the total single-family mortgage portfolios of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
32 The US government Financial Crisis Inquiery Commission testimonials, 2009, http://cybercemetery.
unt.edu/archive/fcic/20110310173617/http://www.fcic.gov/about.
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5 Concluding observations on collateral security in the Danish mortgage
system
Collateral security in the Danish mortgage finance system arose not from a single
factor such as LTVs or capital coverage, but from a delicate interplay between
factors pertaining to the legal framework, the securitization model and functioning
markets that create a sound incentive structure that reduced the need for state
supervision.
The robustness of the Danish mortgage finance system as testified by its
200 years history is generally accredited to the balance principle of securitization
that preserved the system against mismatches between assets and liabilities, and
assigned risks to each participant in the financial system in a disciplining manner.
Standardization and mass securities have brought benefits to Danish borrowers in
the form of lower transaction costs and wide access to and affordability of credit,
while being fully market based. Mortgage law and the supportive legal infrastruc-
ture have in tandem built sufficient collateral security to safeguard lenders and build
trust among investors without being too burdensome.
The Danish mortgage market is deep and characterized by extensive use of
mortgage credit for financing of property transactions and improvements as well as
equity withdrawal. While the legal dimension of collateral security has been
managed through meticulous legal provisions and a functioning legal system, the
volatility of market value has implications on security of collateral. Safety margins
of LTVs and conservative appraisal standards—together with the size and diversity
Fig. 5 Average mortgage rates in percent, Denmark. Short term and long term DKK; short term
Euro. Source: The association of Danish mortgage banks, updated March 2013
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of collateral pools –were important design elements of the finance system, but when
crisis hit the commitment mechanisms stemmed the tide.
Property and credit markets are not neutral to each other, and it was shown that
mortgage law may have strong effects on the property market to the effect that
collateral serves as a transmission channel between the real economy and capital
markets. Tightening of credit conditions have at times affected property markets
negatively and consequently lowered collateral security contrary to the intent, or
legal amendments of the mortgage act have fueled property market bobbles. Access
to early redemption without penalty served as a countercyclical instrument, while a
strong commitment structure embedded in the legal system and finance model kept
borrowers servicing their debt, even in case of negative equity.
It was argued that a stable, firm and mature foundation of property and mortgage
law served as a lever of the mortgage system, and the investments in property rights
infrastructure have paid generously off. Effective and swift forecloses combined
with full legal recourse have served to minimize losses in the ultimate case of
default, but also had a disciplinary function.
In conclusion collateral security was shown to have been built on a complex
formula of sound incentive structures based on the securitization model, strong
commitment mechanisms and functioning market mechanisms that affected the
behavior of the market participants and contributed to building mortgage markets
without cost to the tax payers.
However, new international regulations designed to cure problems in other
financial systems could if adopted put the Danish mortgage system out of balance,
e.g., by negatively impacting on the demand for mortgage bonds.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
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